Why Did Britain & France Declare War on Germany? (Cambridge (CIE) IGCSE History)

Source A: From a history book published in 1992

The Czech crisis brought Europe very close to war. Hitler wrote at this time, ‘It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action.’ The effects of the Munich Agreement had profound implications for European diplomacy and the balance of power, since with hindsight it is clear that Hitler was now prepared to pursue a policy of war, although he wanted to fight any conflict on his terms. His ultimate objective was still the creation of Lebensraum at the expense of the USSR, but hopefully this could be achieved by Britain’s appeasement policy developing into a more general acceptance of Germany’s dominant position in central and eastern Europe. In March 1939 Germany had secured the self-dissolution of the Czech state. Some historians have pointed to the various military orders Hitler gave at this time for the establishment of long-range bomber squadrons and the construction of a large navy as evidence that he was willing to take on Britain. This may well have been his long-term intention, but in the short term Hitler most definitely did not want a war with Britain and France. How could he avoid such a conflict while pursuing his claims against Poland? It was the hope of neutralising Britain and France which drove Hitler into the arms of Stalin. After the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed, Hitler was confident that western military involvement would not follow a German invasion of Poland. But by 3 September Germany was at war with Britain and France. How did Germany find itself in this position? The cause was Hitler’s desire for continental hegemony* and Lebensraum which could only be achieved (as he well knew) by military force

*hegemony = the dominance of one group over another

Source B: From a history book published in 1960

The main thrust of Hitler’s foreign policy was eastwards. He wanted a German empire in eastern Europe but no more. He hoped to achieve this without war. Germany posed no threat to Britain. Chamberlain caused German hostility towards Britain by unnecessarily intervening in the Sudeten crisis of May and September 1938. 

Hitler may have directed his generals to prepare for war but this was only to make Germany stronger, not to fight a war. Hitler believed that Germany was most likely to make gains in eastern Europe if it was strong. He also believed that Communism might break down without a war, allowing him to get what he wanted with no effort at all. However, he had no firm plans and was willing to improvise and take what was offered to him by circumstances. He wanted no more than to make Germany a great power, an aim which all countries have. Hitler’s speech in August 1939 tells us the importance of the Pact with the Soviet Union, ‘Now the probability is great that the West will not intervene.’ His promise to Britain in August that Germany’s frontier in the West was final and that he would not threaten the British Empire, shows he had no ambitions directed against Britain and France. By the end of August the breach between Poland and its allies Britain and France was widening and could soon be wide open. However, it also gave Hitler a chance and he gambled on it by ordering the attack on Poland. This decision, based as it was on Hitler supposing that Britain and France would not go to war, was a mistake, a miscalculation.